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Abstract 
 
This paper shows the numerous problems of conventional economic analysis in the evaluation 
of climate change mitigation policies. The article points out the many limitations, omissions, and the 
arbitrariness that have characterized most evaluation models applied up until now. These 
shortcomings, in an almost overwhelming way, have biased the result towards the recommendation of 
a lower aggressiveness of emission mitigation policies. Consequently, this paper questions whether 
these results provide an appropriate answer to the problem. Finally, various points that an analysis 
coherent with sustainable development should take into account are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The warming of the Earth has generated an environmental concern without precedent. At the 
same time, it has become obvious that the conventional economic analysis as well as the management 
and evaluation methods that it prescribes are not able to give an appropriate answer.  
One particularity of climate change is that the consequences for each country do not depend 
on its individual contribution but rather on the global deterioration. Another characteristic is that its 
effects are long lasting, if not irreversible. Lastly, the impacts of the alterations are hard to determine 
since the processes are so complex. Because of these characteristics, together with the free access to an 
environment shared by all present and future individuals, the necessary incentives for an appropriate 
administration are not given.1 Therefore, we are dealing with an externality problem of unknown 
magnitude, which affects a public good at global scale and at both at intra- and intergenerational 
levels. In this context, the typical prescriptions to the externalities problem do not represent a solution. 
The public concern aroused by  the greenhouse effect is reflected in the number of international 
conferences organized to discuss it. The most visible result has been the commitment to reduce 
emissions set down by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the agreement to make it operative in Bonn 
2001. However, in spite of the notable softening of the terms agreed to in Kyoto, it has not been able 
to include the major countries responsible for the problem. This concern is more than justified if one 
takes into account the greater climatic instability and the natural disasters experienced in the last 
decade that have been related to climate change, such as hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the floods of 
Venezuela in 1999. Unfortunately, conventional economic analysis has failed to provide solutions for 
this concern, and it has been used rather to legitimatize and give a “scientific” justification to the no-
regulation policy and the free performance of the energy sector. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly explains the uncertainties of the 
greenhouse effect, its consequences on climate, and the impacts of climate change. Section 3 studies 
                                                          
1 Usually this problem is identified with “the tragedy of the commons” stated by Hardin (1968). This is not correct since 
common management of public goods works appropriately in many cases. The problem is rather the “free access” one, where 
there is not any management limiting the use of the resources (Pearce, 1999, p. 490). 
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the problems of conventional economic analysis and Section 4 studies the biases, omissions, and the 
arbitrariness that have been introduced in the study of policies to mitigating climate change. Section 5 
highlights some points to be considered for an analysis coherent with sustainable development. 
Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Greenhouse effect and climate change 
 
Global warming and the resulting climate change takes place due to what has been termed “the 
greenhouse effect”. This is a natural phenomenon, caused by a series of gases present in the 
atmosphere and it is responsible for the temperatures that make the Earth inhabitable. The problem 
arises because human activity has accelerated the accumulation of these gases and, as a consequence, 
the warming process has also been accelerated.2 
 
2.1. Uncertainties associated to climate change  
Under certain conditions (risks exogenously determined, and certainty about the different 
possible results and their respective probabilities) conventional methods can lead to an efficient 
allocation of resources in the presence of risk. These conditions are not given in the case of climate 
change, where the risks are poorly understood and depend on human performance. There is 
uncertainty and ignorance about basic questions. First, there is the difficulty of measuring emissions, 
and even worse, of making predictions about future concentrations. Second, there are many 
interactions that complicate the study of the relation between emissions concentration and warming.3 
Third, even assuming a certain level of warming, there is a great uncertainty about the climatic impact 
on the different regions of the world. Fourth, there is the difficulty to identify and estimate the 
magnitude of the impacts that climate change might cause on the environment and on human well-
                                                          
2 According to the IPCC (2001a) between 1750 and 2000 CO2 emissions have contributed 60%, CH4 19.8%, CFCs 14%, and 
N2O 6.2%, measured in terms of radiative forcing.  
3 Some greenhouse gases produce chemical interactions (causing problems such as the ozone layer depletion or acid rain) and 
their final effect on global warming is much more difficult to determine than in the case of CO2. 
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being. Lastly, the uncertainty persists when considering what sacrifice (in monetary terms) a stricter 
control of emissions would imply. In each one of these stages the collaboration of specialists of 
different fields becomes necessary. In climate change, more than in any other problem, it becomes 
clear that the management of a sustainable development is an interdisciplinary task.  
 
2.2. Global warming and climate change 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001a) the average 
temperature of the terrestrial surface has increased around 0.6ºC since 1861. It is estimated that the 
increase in the last 10000 years has been 1ºC, the rate of warming being constant until the last decades 
of the XX century in which it has increased to 0.15ºC per decade. The IPCC estimates that the average 
temperature could increase between 1.4 and 5.8ºC between 1990 and the end of XXI century. This is a 
warming without precedent in human history, causing a rise in sea level between 0.09 and 0.88 meters. 
However, the real problem of global warming is not the average increase in temperature, but 
the associated climatic anomalies and changes that might occur. The result of global warming can be 
more heat or more cold, more rains or more droughts, depending on the region and, in general, more 
climatic instability with an increase in the frequency of natural disasters such as hurricanes, droughts 
or floods. The relationship between average warming and climate change is a complex one. The 
increase in average Earth surface temperature might be a useful indicator of the severity of the 
problem, since the greater the warming the more the climate alterations. However, nothing indicates 
that this relationship is a linear one. 
  
2.3. Climate change impacts 
Agriculture losses, losses in biodiversity and forests, sea level rise, illnesses, energy costs, 
migration costs, natural disasters, losses in recreational activities, and water supply problems are some 
of the foreseeable impacts. Several models of integrated assessment have been made in order to 
incorporate the interrelations between climate and economy (a review can be found in Rotmans et al., 
1998). These models present estimations, in monetary terms, of the impacts of global climate change 
and emission reduction policies. On the whole, it is calculated that global GDP would change little 
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with small temperature increases while greater temperature increases would boost the net losses 
(IPCC, 2001b). The impacts would be much greater in poor countries, due partly to their lower 
capacity to adapt and their bigger vulnerability; in some cases, the local impact could be catastrophic. 
However, the impact difference in different areas brings about serious problems in the search for 
solutions because it accentuates the free-rider incentives caused by the “public good” nature of 
emissions control policy. 
According to the IPCC there is the possibility of extreme impacts, like changes in ocean 
currents, a considerable melting of polar ice-caps, and an accelerated warming due to the release of 
carbon and methane pockets or to carbon cycle feedbacks in the terrestrial biosphere, among others. 
Should they occur, their effects would be of great magnitude and irreversible in the long term. 
Although it is unknown, we can speculate that the probability of these phenomena depends on the rate, 
magnitude, and duration of climate change (IPCC, 2001b). However, this probability is simply ignored 
in most models’ calculations.  
According to most calculations, one would need to sacrifice around 2% of the global annual 
GDP to make a significant difference in the control of emissions. As Schelling (1992, p. 8) affirms, it 
only “postpones the GDP of 2050 to 2051”. Nevertheless, in general, current models suggest that it is 
not profitable to take action for mitigating climate change, or that the action should be very limited 
(e.g. Manne and Richels, 1992, 1999; Peck and Teisberg, 1992, 1994, 1999; Nordhaus, 1993, 1994; 
Manne, et al., 1995; Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Chakravorty et al., 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999; 
Hamaide and Boland, 2000). However, these models have many limitations, biases, and omissions that 
seriously question the validity of their solutions.  
 
3.  Problems of conventional analysis applied to climate change 
 
Many of the models that have been used are based on traditional economic instruments such 
as cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Nordhaus et al., various years; Peck and Teisberg, 1992; Manne et al., 
1995). On the other hand, diverse models have also been created to search for cost-effective paths to 
reduce emissions and achieve specific emissions or atmospheric concentrations goals. These models, 
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in spite of not being as pretentious as global cost-benefit analyses, maintain a good part of the 
limitations of conventional analysis and most of them also incorporate strong biases in assumptions 
that are critical for their results, which limits their capacity to give appropriate answers.  
 
3.1. The discounting of climate change impacts 
Part of the controversy about the models applied to climate change has focused on the choice 
of the discount rate.4 The social discount rate (s) in these models used to be expressed with the 
Ramsey formula: 
s = ρ + ηg 
where ρ is the pure time preference rate, η is the elasticity of marginal utility (absolute value) and g is 
the growth rate of per capita consumption. That is to say, discounting is applied because of impatience 
and the belief that in the future there would be more wealth. 
Conventional analysis applies the time discount of present society to discount all costs and 
benefits that will occur in the future, as if all future impacts occurred to present individuals. In general, 
the models consider all humankind as if it were an immortal agent. It seems clear that the unreal 
assumptions of conventional discounting cannot lead to an allocation consistent with individuals’ 
preferences. The consumption of future individuals is discounted with a rate that shows the impatience  
in the own consumption of present society, while the logical procedure would be to consider the 
preferences regarding the well-being of the future generations suffering climate change impacts. The 
issue is how do we value this well-being and not what do we want to save in order to increase our 
future consumption. An intergenerational weighting appropriately showing these preferences should 
be applied (Padilla, 2002). In addition, if a discount rate above the rate of economic growth is used, 
then the current cost of a significant control of emissions expressed in future value could be larger 
than the whole future GDP (Rabl, 1996). Deciding not to do anything from the beginning would be 
cheaper and more honest that using this device. 
                                                          
4 Cline (1992), Nordhaus (1994), and Fankhauser (1994) agree about the importance of this choice for the prescribed 
mitigation level of greenhouse gases. 
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The argument of the decreasing marginal utility of consumption is also controversial. To apply 
a high discount rate because of an assumed future prosperity could lead to compromising this very 
prosperity because of undervaluing the impacts of future climate change. Moreover, many of the 
models applied to climate change extrapolate future rates of economic growth from past behavior, 
without considering the negative impacts that this growth has caused on the environment. If 
discounting is applied to future individuals because of the belief they will be richer, this same 
reasoning would justify weighting the impacts of present individuals according to their wealth, what is 
rarely done.5 Conventional models assume that future individuals will be richer. This induces the idea 
that it is not profitable to make efforts in the present to reduce emissions that will affect future people 
(with a much smaller marginal utility).6 However, this argument obviates the fact that the countries 
that are creating most of the problem are rich countries, while the ones that will suffer most severely 
are poor countries. Actually, climate change is already affecting poor countries with an increasing 
frequency of anomalies and climatic disasters. It is, at least, doubtful that the poor of the future will be 
in much better condition than the rich of the present; even more so if devastating effects of climate 
change on their ecological and socioeconomic systems are allowed. If the argument of marginal utility 
is used coherently, then when comparing costs and benefits, it should be taken into account that the 
hypothetical renouncement of bigger growth that might involve a stricter emissions control, should be 
in charge of the richest countries (main emitters), while climate change mitigation would facilitate that 
the conditions of life in the poor countries are not made worse.  
Certainly, neither the argument of decreasing marginal utility nor the pure time preference 
justify the application of a constant time discounting, as if the individuals originating the problem and 
the ones suffering it were the same individuals, richer every time. 
                                                          
5 Azar (1999) introduced equity weights and showed that, if the loss of a human life in a poor country is given the same 
monetary value as in a rich country, the result is a greater “optimal” reduction both in rich countries and in total than in 
conventional models. 
6 According to Schelling (1995), if in the future everybody is better off, the greater marginal utility would be the one of 
present poor people and it would be more efficient to increase their standard of life. Neumayer (1999) argues that a lower 
time discounting would be inconsistent with intergenerational equity, since he believes that the future will always be richer. 
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3.2. The Hicks-Kaldor compensation criterion and valuation problems 
Conventional cost-benefit analysis is based on the Hicks-Kaldor compensation criterion, 
accordingly, a project is socially profitable if it is hypothetically possible that the ones that gain could 
compensate the ones that lose (Kaldor criterion), or if it is not possible that the ones that lose could 
pay to the ones that gain for not undertaking the project (Hicks criterion). If the present value of the 
benefits is greater than the present value of the costs, then it is assumed that those who benefit from 
the project can compensate those that are harmed by it, improving their initial situation (potential 
Pareto-improvement). If compensation was paid, everybody would improve and a net gain for society 
would occur (actual Pareto-improvement). However, whether this compensation occurs or not is 
irrelevant for cost-benefit analysis, it simply assumes that gains compensate loses, without taking into 
account who gains and who loses.  
In ordinary evaluations, cost-benefit analysis without compensation can be justified if it is 
assumed that the marginal utility of a monetary unit of costs has the same social value as a monetary 
unit of benefits (Lind, 1997). Another justification is that, if there are many small projects everybody 
gains on the average. As Lind states, the ethical validity of these arguments depends on the initial 
distribution being judged as correct. In climate change, both the magnitude of the impacts and the very 
unequal distribution between those that gain and those that lose would invalidate these justifications. 
Moreover, it would be incorrect to talk about value-free or objective results. 
In the case of climate change, the Hicks-Kaldor criterion assumes that a hypothetical monetary 
compensation between current individuals and future individuals (from the next 50 to 200 years) is 
feasible. But, currently, there are no institutions in place to make sure that this fund will find its way 
into the hands of its corresponding beneficiaries. The practical possibility of doing a monetary 
compensation for climate change is nonexistent. The central logic of cost-benefit analysis fails to 
make sense in the intergenerational context: it is not possible for those that “win” to compensate those 
that “lose” (there is no potential Pareto-improving change). 
Another issue to consider is if monetary compensation is sufficient. Accepting that a monetary 
compensation is valid requires making very strong assumptions, such as perfect substitutability and 
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non-existence of irreversibilities, issues that are not clear at all. Climate change might cause 
irreversibilities and catastrophes and some goods and processes non-susceptible of being compensated 
can be destroyed. There are also many relevant factors that are at least questionable that could be 
traduced into the monetary valuations of real or hypothetical markets. In decisions affecting elemental 
rights, such as the basic conditions of life of future generations, the compensation criterion might not 
be acceptable. 
In general, when applying the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, the models assume that everything can 
be valued in monetary terms, although they only partially take into account the goods and services 
without a market. However, the implicit assumption of perfect substitutability between any types of 
goods is not scientifically based, but rather based in faith or the will of having easily tractable models. 
The compensation criterion also implies to price human lives, which, in itself, requires assuming that 
the method for determining its value is correct and that money in rich countries can be compared with 
lives in poor countries (Azar, 2000), what again implies a determinant value judgement.  
Conventional analysis assumes that values are known, static, and exogenously determined. It 
is easy to value a toothbrush, but how can one value the extinction of half of the species? People do 
not have well articulated values about ecosystems, analysts assume that they do (and that they can be 
extrapolated to other places and periods) and the values assumed in the studies determine the preferred 
policies (Lave y Dowlatabadi, 1993). 
The problem of climate change violates the assumption of marginal changes and the income 
effect in the valuations is very important, thus the cost-benefit analysis based in marginal measures is 
not appropriate. In addition, the willingness-to-pay measure is often used instead of the willingness-to-
accept measure (e.g. Fankhauser, 1994; Pearce et al., 1996). There is important empirical evidence that 
counters neoclassical theory, showing these valuations to be very different, even in the case of small 
income effects. In contingent valuation studies, the quotient between willingness-to-accept and 
willingness-to-pay is from 2 to more than 10. In the case of climate change, the income effect is 
significant, which causes the willingness-to-pay to be much smaller than the value of the 
compensation people would accept. In addition to the income effect, there is the endowment effect 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which implies than loses are more weighted than gains. The 
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difference between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept can also be due to the consideration 
of some goods as inalienable. These explanations, and the empirical evidence that supports them, 
indicate that it is incorrect to use one measure when it is not the one stated by the problem, and even 
less so in a problem with the great magnitudes of climate change. Benefited and harmed people are 
placed in different areas and belong to different generations. This is particularly serious when the 
harmed ones are those that have less resources, which again, raises serious ethical questions.  
Different regions, populations, and cultures, as well as different generations are affected in 
differing ways by climate change, and in some cases they value the same goods in a different way 
(Lave and Dowlatabadi, 1993). Who is being represented in the models’ valuations? It does not make 
much sense to face the problem as if there were only one decision-maker, as the analysis which 
maximize a utility function ad infinitum (e.g. Nordhaus, various years), without taking into account 
the different perceptions of who gains and who loses in the process of maximization. 
Conventional analysis assumes that present individuals have the right to pollute and that this is 
profitable if the higher economic growth that could be achieved is greater than the valuation of future 
harm. The countries that are most affected by climate change are, with all probability, the poor ones, 
while the main responsibility and the only ones that have resources to act fall to the rich countries. 
These countries have an ecological debt with the rest of the world and with future generations, since 
they have appropriated and made an unsustainable use of an environment that belongs to all present 
and future individuals. It is not justifiable, under any acceptable concept of equity or justice, that the 
poor have to suffer the ecological burden that involves the greater development of rich countries. 
 
3.3. The distribution of rights in conventional analysis 
 Conventional economic analysis assumes the premise that the Earth and all its resources, 
including the climatic system, belong to the present, and that it has the right to do with them whatever 
it pleases, including the right to destroy them. It assumes that the only valid valuations are those of 
markets, where neither future generations nor present poor people can bid. But, is it legitimate to 
assume that they do not have any right? Considering that the same existence of future generations 
depends on the present preferences that can be expressed in real or hypothetical markets seems 
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ethically corrupt! 
The models assume that there exists the natural right to pollute, thus without obligation to 
compensate to those that suffer the consequences of this pollution. From this perspective, Hamaide 
and Boland (2000) try to overcome the limitation of Hicks-Kaldor criterion searching ‘Pareto-optimal’ 
solutions where everybody wins thanks to effective compensation. Their solution suggests that poor 
countries, the most benefited by mitigation policies, pay an economic compensation to China and the 
United States so that they control their emissions. In spite of the neutrality that conventional analysis 
tries to convey, it is undeniable that it is laden with strong value judgements that are ethically 
questionable and politically unacceptable.  
The potential compensation implicit in optimization analyses consists of the payment by the 
affected of the future in order that the present incurs the “costs” of controlling its emissions. The 
optimal level is achieved when the so-called “marginal cost” of reducing emissions equals the present 
value of the “marginal benefit” experienced by future generations. That is to say, it states the 
hypothetical payment of a compensation by future generations in order to avoid the present destroying 
the necessary conditions for life in the future. Moreover, the compensation would be from poor to rich 
countries. 
Furthermore, stating the problem as costs for the present and benefits for the future can 
facilitate the approval of policies unfavorable to the future, since usually, a phenomenon is more 
valued when it is considered as a loss than when it is considered as a gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). This can also affect the chosen discount rate. As Mohr (1995) states, the ambiguity of the time 
preference depending on whether it refers to costs or benefits, leads to that, according to how the 
problem is presented, the citizens can be persuaded to agree with a particular opinion. The worst thing 
is that the result is often presented as the “scientific” one.  
There are strong arguments for questioning the ethical validity of conventional analysis and 
the application of the (hypothetical) compensation to climate change. It is clear that for a more 
transparent analysis the more than questionable value judgements that are hidden behind the 
optimization analyses should be made explicit. 
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3.4. The point of view of sustainable development 
The most popular definition of sustainable development states that it is the “…development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.” (WCED, 1987, p. 43). A development complying with this definition would not 
allow the present to use resources in a way that jeopardizes the opportunities of the future. This 
implies recognizing the rights of future generations to enjoy a global ecological and economic capacity 
non-diminished in relation to the one we presently enjoy. In other words, the Earth and its resources, 
including climatic system, belong not only to the present rich people, but also to all (present and 
future) individuals. Using this view, the biased position of conventional analysis would not be correct 
when it argues about the “costs” that involves to the present reducing (or not excessively increasing) 
its greenhouse gas emissions in order to yield some “benefits” for future generations. The issue is to 
deal with the limitation of uncontrolled emissions growth, recognizing the rights of future generations 
so that their ecological and socioeconomic system does not deteriorate further. This is not to “give” 
anything to future generations, but rather to stop taking away something that, from the sustainable 
development perspective, they are entitled.  
Present generations have the responsibility to study how their performance will affect the 
climate and environment that will be enjoyed by future generations and which is the most efficient 
way of respecting their rights. There are strong ethical, moral, deontological or contractual arguments 
for affirming that this would be a more legitimate starting point for the analysis of climate change 
policies. Section 5 states some of the issues to be considered for an analysis consistent with 
sustainable development. 
 
4. Some additional limitations, biases, and omissions 
 
The problems of the models used for determining the appropriate mitigation policies go 
beyond the limitations of conventional analysis. In general, both optimization and cost-benefit 
analyses incorporate value judgements, omissions, and arbitrary assumptions about factors that 
critically affect their results. The problem is that the biases they introduce always follow the same 
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pattern: they tend to undervalue the loses and overvalue the economic gains of climate change, and 
hence lead to the recommendation that either emission control should be mild, or that there should be 
no control, at least in the short term.7  
First, they tend to make quite optimistic assumptions about the virtues of economic growth. 
Current models usually assume high rates of future economic growth justifying it by past growth, 
without taking into account the negative environmental effect of this growth. This leads to the 
application of a greater discount rate (because of decreasing marginal utility of consumption) and to 
assume a greater capacity of adaptation, thus considering less serious the impacts caused by climate 
change.8  
Another bias is highlighted by Schultz and Kasting (1997). The integrated assessment climate-
economy models are based in pre-industrial CO2 uptake rates. These undervalue the life of CO2 in the 
atmosphere as they do not appropriately consider the saturation of carbon sinks. Consequently, the 
maximum concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere and the persistence of global warming are 
underestimated. In order to forecast absorption rates, carbon cycle models should consider the 
previous history of CO2 emissions.9 In the same sense, Price (1995) argues that Nordhaus (1994) 
overestimates the ocean’s absorption of CO2. 
 The climatic models employed in the studies are continuous and do not reflect the 
discontinuities that might occur. They assume that the change in CO2 atmospheric concentrations is 
smooth and marginal (which could be reasonable) and then “deduce” that climate change and their 
impacts will be smooth and marginal (Pizer, 1996). This involves making an important qualitative 
leap, ignoring issues such as saturation of sinks, and the possible changes in equilibrium and 
discontinuities that might cause drastic changes. Oceanic currents and the atmospheric system could 
                                                          
7 Chapman and Khanna (2000) casts doubts about the wisdom of most sophisticated (and costly) studies being financed by 
energy institutions (with the remarkable exception of Nordhaus), which could explain the biases, as they are interested 
parties. 
8 However, the models rarely consider the possible positive economic effects associated with the control of emissions, such 
as the “double dividend” (see e.g. Pearce, 1991), or the development of new sectors. 
9 Schultz and Kasting (1997) obtain greater “optimal” reductions than Nordhaus (1994). 
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change to alternative equilibrium causing rapid and extreme changes, with catastrophic impacts in 
some cases. The non-lineal character of climatic dynamics is often denied, perhaps for obtaining easily 
tractable models. Moreover, estimates generally do not take into account the effect of the rate of 
change: the greater the rate the greater the impact. They do not take into account either the effects of 
changes in climatic variability (IPCC, 2001b). Conventional evaluations (e.g. Nordhaus’ studies) also 
ignore to a great extent the negative effects of global warming on ecosystems (Howarth, 1996). 
Most models assume that uncertainty is small and manageable (Weyant et al., 1995). In 
climate change many interactions occur between complex natural and social systems in which little is 
known. Not recognizing the levels of uncertainty and ignorance in the models lead to erroneous results 
that should not be qualified as “optimal”. Moreover, these models ignore the possibility of extreme 
phenomena, or simply assign them a negligible probability, when in fact both the possible results and 
their corresponding probabilities are ignored. A factor that should be important in decision-making is 
not taken into account, which biases the result towards a lower emissions control.  
 Most analysis (including the ones by Nordhaus) overlook that, besides their impact in 
greenhouse effect, emissions control has other significant associated positive effects (secondary 
benefits). The reduction in the particles that result from the combustion of fossil fuels (such as SOx, 
NOx and COV) would lead to a reduction in pollution and the resulting enhancement of health and 
well-being. If this were taken into account, the control of emissions as well as the rate of reduction 
would be greater than the one that most analyses indicate (Ekins, 1996). 
 Several studies (e.g. Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; McKibbin et al., 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer, 
1999; Hamaide and Boland, 2000) assume a negative or very low cost of reduction in poor countries 
and greater marginal costs of reduction in richer countries. The result is that, in order to achieve 
“global efficiency”, the greater reduction should be made in poor countries. However, there is no 
theoretical or empirical basis for these assumptions (Chapman and Khanna, 2000). It is obvious that 
focussing control efforts in the third world would not lead to a very ambitious environmental policy. 
 Many studies also assume that even if there were no controls, a peak in greenhouse gas 
emissions would occur, from which these emissions would diminish. This is known as the 
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis, according to which the environmental problem would 
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disappear in the long term thanks to economic growth. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis 
concerning greenhouse gases tends to refute it, especially in the case of CO2 (see e.g. Roca et al., 
2001). Even if the hypothesis was true, the delinking between environmental pressure and economic 
growth would occur at levels too high for income and emissions, which does not reduce the urgency of 
applying environmental policies (Selden and Song, 1994; Stern et al., 1996). Moreover, present 
forecasts of future emissions are less optimistic than the ones used in these models (IPCC, 2000). 
 Most models assume that technical change is exogenous. Important annual improvements in 
energy efficiency are assumed (reductions in the energy demand per unit of product) independent of 
the impact of energy prices. Chapman and Khanna (2000) argue that between 1980 and 1996 energy 
intensity has been constant at a global level, with a reduction in rich countries and an increase in poor 
countries. Therefore, past experience would not justify the application of such assumptions. On the 
other hand, the possibility of a technical change induced by the response of firms to market conditions 
is, in general, not considered. There is evidence that an important part of technical change in the 
energy sector is endogenous (Grubb and Walker, 1992). Grubb and Köhler (2000) analyze the 
consequences of assuming an important induced technical change and they conclude that it tends to 
accelerate emissions control because the same mitigation develops the knowledge that allows an 
emissions control at lower cost and causes it to be very cheap in the long term. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that, for the moment, the impacts associated with the upper 
margin of warming estimated by the last report of the IPCC (2001b) has not yet been investigated. 
This also leads us to presume that the adequate reduction in emissions has been underestimated, even 
from the point of view of conventional models. 
  
5. Towards an analysis coherent with sustainable development 
 
The obligation of respecting the rights of future generations jointly with the limitations of 
conventional models impose an analysis of mitigation policies incorporating constraints in terms of 
climate change impacts. Given the impossibility of establishing an adequate compensation because of 
the uncertainties, ignorance, substitution problems, irreversibilities, non-marginal changes and time 
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discounting inconsistency that climate change involves, the obligations of the present should lead to 
the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, ultimate objective of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. In this way, guaranteeing their ecological opportunities, a 
fair treatment to the future would be ensured. Moreover, the respect of the rights of the future should 
be done in a way that involves the lowest sacrifice to the present.  
Various papers have investigated the cost-effective paths of reduction of emissions in order to 
achieve different concentration targets. Unfortunately, most of them have not been overly concerned 
with how to determine what level of concentration is appropriate or consistent with sustainable 
development and neither have they worried about incorporating all the information that is relevant for 
decision-making, but were presented as simple technical cost-minimization exercises. Some of the 
problems that these models embody have been shown above and many of them suggest an even 
smaller reduction of emissions in the short term than cost-benefit analyses (e.g. Richels and Edmonds, 
1995). Hammitt (1999) shows, for different concentration targets, a lower aggressiveness in the short 
term of these models. This has been explained by the following reasons: avoiding the premature 
retirement of existent capital stock; existence of carbon sinks, which means that the proportion of CO2 
remaining in the atmosphere is lower for earlier emissions; technological progress, which causes 
cheaper emission reduction in the future; and because of discounting, which makes the present value 
of costs lower if reduction is delayed (Wigley et al., 1996). Nevertheless, these explanations are quite 
questionable. It has already been shown that if technical change is induced and not exogenous as is it 
usually assumed, it is better to reduce emissions earlier (Grubb and Köhler, 2001) and short term 
policies would accelerate the development of the changes that would reduce mitigation costs. Grubb 
(1997) casts doubts on the appropriateness of postponing the renewal of capital and argues that this 
could involve greater total costs, since it would also postpone the innovation which reduces mitigation 
costs. In these results also influence that, in general, the impacts of different warming rates as well as 
the discontinuities and possible changes of equilibrium are not taken into account. If these factors were 
considered, one would question the appropriateness of prematurely saturating carbon sinks. In addition 
there is the aforementioned inconsistency that involves applying discounting to intergenerational 
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problems. In summary, a targets or objectives approach should not involve a lower reduction than 
conventional cost-benefit analyses. Rather on the contrary, if the objective has to be consistent with 
sustainable development. 
One of the approaches that has gone further in the search of an integrated assessment coherent 
with sustainable development is the tolerable windows approach, explained in Petschel-Held et al. 
(1999), Yohe (1999) and Dowlatabadi (1999). Starting from the constraints in tolerable changes, it 
imposes limitations in the rate of warming, the level of concentrations, the path of emissions and 
finally the policy instruments. It can consider different types of information and does not require 
translating everything into monetary terms. Through this approach, the obligation of preserving the 
natural environment for future generations could become quantitative constraints in policies. 
Several authors, including Hasselmann (1999), have criticized that the targets approach is 
inconsistent with determining the optimal allocation of all resources. However, his criticism is based 
on the premise of conventional analysis, that of not recognizing any right to the future. Even Nordhaus 
(1997), author of the most influential neoclassical optimization model, sees a clear opposition between 
economic optimality and sustainable development and suggests the previous introduction of targets for 
the permissible levels of climate change. 
Nevertheless, a serious limitation of most cost-effectiveness analyses is that they give up 
taking into account the short and medium term impacts, focusing only in the final long-term objective. 
This could delay the reduction of emissions, since higher short term emissions could be compensated 
with greater reductions in the long term, which does not happen in the cost-benefit approach (Grubb, 
1997). The short and long term sacrifices that the reduction involves are accounted for under both 
analyses, but the short and medium term consequences of emissions are only considered under cost-
benefit analysis. This is inconsistent with sustainable development. The introduction of limits to 
ensure that climate change impacts do not jeopardize the global capacity of future generations should 
not involve avoiding the considerations of the different impacts that might occur and to try to 
appropriately allocate the resources. Any climate change impact on the future implies an alteration of 
the endowment to be enjoyed by future generations and so should be considered in the determination 
of the adequate policies. The structure of rights that sustainable development implies turns any impact 
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that diminishes the capacity of the future into an obligation for the present. In this sense, once any 
intolerable (and so non-susceptible of being compensated for) impact is avoided, the compensation for 
any ecological debt acquired with the future for present contamination should be accounted for and 
made effective, and monetary compensation could not be the most appropriate one. The necessary 
information for determining which impacts would be intolerable should be collected and the 
institutional framework created to be able to establish and articulate the adequate compensations in 
order that they can be achieved in the future.  
In summary, conventional cost-benefit analysis is not appropriate for a problem with the 
extreme uncertainty and severity of climate change. There is ignorance about many costs and benefits 
and it is not very feasible for many impacts to be expressed in monetary terms. All variables relevant 
for society should be taken into account, not only those that can be valued in money. It would be more 
reasonable to try to obtain solutions that could be considered satisfactory using all the available 
information, than the pretension of conventional analysis of obtaining optimal points at the margin 
through models based on unreal assumptions and that are unable to show all the facets of the problem. 
  
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper presented a critical review of the limitations of the evaluation models used in the 
problem of climate change. A first conclusion is that the application of cost-benefit criteria loses 
legitimacy in the climate change context as many of the assumptions that justify it are violated. Most 
studies have also tended to incorporate value judgements and arbitrary assumptions and even to 
obviate a good part of the relevant information, which contributes to bias the results towards the 
conclusion that climate change is not a problem requiring urgent action. 
Conventional analysis assumes that there is the natural right to pollute or even destroy the 
climatic system. The present paper refuses this premise and suggests an alternative approach in which 
the future is entitled to a non-deteriorated climatic system, and therefore the present has the obligation 
to avoid or to compensate any alteration of it.  
An appropriate assessment of the policies to apply in climate change also requires 
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incorporating the growing knowledge about the phenomenon. In the evaluation of adequate policies, 
all relevant information should be taken into account without using model complexity to hide value 
judgements and arbitrary assumptions about questionable factors or hiding elements that are 
determinants for decision-making. On the contrary, the analysis should serve to clarify what are the 
trade-offs and the choices that can be made. The integrated assessment should serve for increasing the 
knowledge of the phenomenon through the same process. The gathering of information, the study of 
alternative policies, the estimation of impacts and the knowledge of the critical parameters should lead 
to a better position for making informed decisions. 
Even if the models determining the adequate policies (consistent with sustainable 
development) are designed, it is necessary to ensure that there are institutions in place that can 
establish emissions control and be responsible for the transfer of adequate compensations. It does not 
make much sense to produce models in search of adequate global policies, if there are no institutions 
with the capacity to apply them. These institutions should be able to achieve reduction commitments 
by different countries according to their capacity and their responsibility in the problem. It is urgent 
that the adoption of international commitments go beyond the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn 2001 
agreement. It is imperative that these institutions have the capacity to sanction atmosphere free-rider 
practices and eliminate the incentives that cheat the agreements. The disappearance of credible 
sanctions (besides the wide consideration of natural carbon sinks) of the Bonn agreement seriously 
questions its effectiveness.  
Finally, people of poorer countries are suffering and will continue to suffer the most severe 
impacts of climate change, while some countries have occupied and are occupying much more 
environmental space in terms of historic CO2 emissions than would correspond to their population 
(Alcántara and Roca, 1999). Rich countries have a moral obligation to pay the ecological debt 
acquired in having expropriated and destroyed the right of poor countries to a non-deteriorated 
climate. From an ethical point of view, in the long term, the only justifiable distribution of rights is the 
one that gives the same right to any human being — present or future. The distribution according to 
current per capita emission, as established in the Kyoto Protocol agreements, strongly favors those that 
have contributed the most to the problem, which is clearly unfair. 
  
21
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author wishes to thank the comments and suggestions from Federico Aguilera, Vicent Alcántara, 
Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Joan Pasqual and Jordi Roca. Financial support from projects BEC2000-
415 and SGR99-107 is also acknowledged. 
 
References 
 
Alcántara, V., Roca, J., 1999. CO2 emissions and the occupation of the ‘environmental space’. An 
empirical exercise. Energy Policy 27, 505-508. 
Azar, C., 1999. Weight factors in cost-benefit analysis of climate change. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 13, 249-268. 
Azar, C., 2000. Economics and distribution in the greenhouse. Climatic Change 47, 233-238. 
Chakravorty, U., Roumasset, J., Tse, K., 1997. Endogenous substitution among energy resources and 
global warming. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1201-1234. 
Chapman, D., Khanna, N., 2000. Crying no wolf: why economists don’t worry about climate change, 
and should. Climatic Change 47, 225-232. 
 Cline, W.R., 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC. 
Cline, W.R., 1996. The impact of global warming on agriculture: comment. American Economic 
Review 86, 1309-1311. 
Dowlatabadi, H., 1999. Climate change thresholds and guardrails for emissions. Climatic Change 41, 
297-301. 
Ekins, P., 1996. The secondary benefits of CO2 abatement: how much emission reduction do they 
justify? Ecological Economics 16, 13-24. 
Fankhauser, S., 1994. The social costs of greenhouse emissions: An expected value approach. Energy 
Journal 15, 157-184. 
  
22
Grubb, M., 1997. Technologies, energy systems and the timing of CO2 emissions abatement. An 
overview of economic issues. Energy Policy 25, 159-172. 
Grubb, M., Köhler, J., 2000. Induced technical change: Evidence and implications for energy-
environmental modeling and policy. Working Paper 0031, Department of Applied Economics, 
Cambridge University. 
Grubb, M., Walker, J., 1992. Emerging Energy Technologies: Impacts and Policy Implications. Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London. 
Hamaide, B., Boland, J.J., 2000. Benefits, costs, and cooperation in greenhouse gas abatement. 
Climatic Change 47, 239-258. 
Hammitt, J.K., 1999. Evaluation endpoints and climate policy: atmospheric stabilization, benefit-cost 
analysis, and near-term greenhouse-gas emissions. Climatic Change 41, 447-468.  
Hardin, G., 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243-1248. 
Hasselmann, K., 1999. Intertemporal accounting of climate change – Harmonizing Economic 
Efficiency and Climate Stewardship. Climatic Change 41, 333-350. 
Howarth, R.B., 1996. Climate change and overlapping generations. Contemporary Economic Policy 
14, 100-111. 
IPCC, 2000. Emissions Scenarios. Summary for Policy Makers. Special Report of IPCC Working 
Group III. In http://www.ipcc.ch 
IPCC, 2001a. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Third Assessment Report. Summary for Policymakers. In http://www.ipcc.ch 
IPCC, 2001b. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Third Assessment Report. Summary for Policymakers. In http://www.ipcc.ch 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 
47, 363-391. 
Lave, L.B., Dowlatabadi, H., 1993. Climate change policy: the effects of personal beliefs and 
scientific uncertainty. Environmental Science Technology 27, 1962-1972. 
Lind, R.C., 1997. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency in water policy 
evaluation. Climatic Change 37, 41-62. 
  
23
Manne, A.S., Richels, R.G., 1992. Buying Greenhouse Insurance: The Economic Costs of Carbon 
Dioxide Emisión Limits. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Manne, A.S., Richels, R.G., 1999. The Kyoto protocol: A cost effective strategy for meeting 
environmental objectives? Energy Journal, Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol – A 
Multi-model Evaluation, 1-23. 
Manne, A., Mendelsohn, R., Richels, R., 1995. MERGE – A model for evaluating regional and global 
effects of GHG reduction policies. Energy Policy 23, 17-34. 
McKibbin, W.J., Ross, M.T., Shackleton, R., Wilcoxen, P.J. 1999. Emissions trading, capital flows 
and the Kyoto protocol. Energy Journal. Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol – A Multi-
Model Evaluation, 287-333. 
Mohr, E., 1995. Greenhouse policy persuasion: towards a positive theory of discounting the climate 
future. Ecological Economics 15, 235-245. 
Neumayer, E., 1999. Weak versus Strong Sustainability. Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing 
Paradigms. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Nordhaus, W.D., 1993. Rolling the “DICE”: An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse 
gases. Resource and Energy Economics 5, 27-50. 
Nordhaus, W.D., 1994. Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Nordhaus, W.D., 1997. Discounting in economics and climate change. Climatic Change 37, 315-328. 
Nordhaus, W.D., Boyer, J.G., 1999. Roll the DICE Again: Economic Models of Global Warming. 
Yale University, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Nordhaus, W. D., Yang, Z., 1996. A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative 
climate-change strategies. American Economic Review 86, 741-765. 
Padilla, E. (2002) Intergenerational equity and sustainability. Ecological Economics, in press. 
Pearce, D., 1991. The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming. Economic Journal 101, 938-
948. 
  
24
Pearce, D., 1999. Economic analysis of global environmental issues: global warming, stratospheric 
ozone and biodiversity. In van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (Editor) Handbook of Environmental and 
Resource Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Pearce, D., Cline, W.R., Achanta, A.N., Fankhauser, S., Pachauri, R.K., Tol, R.S.J., Vellinga, P., 
1996. The Social Costs of Climate Change: Damages and Benefits of Control. Report of the IPCC 
Working Group III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Peck, S.C., Teisberg, T.J., 1992. CETA: a model for carbon emissions trajectory assessment. Energy 
Journal 13, 55-77. 
Peck, S.C., Teisberg, T.J., 1994. Optimal carbon emissions trajectories when damages depend on the 
rate or level of global warming. Climatic Change 28, 289-314. 
Peck, S.C., Teisberg, T.J., 1999. CO2 emissions control agreement: incentives for regional 
participation. Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol – A Multi-Model Evaluation. Energy 
Journal, 367-390. 
Petschel-Held, G., Schellnhuber, H.-J., Bruckner, T., Tóth, F., Hasselmann, K., 1999. The tolerable 
windows approach: Theoretical and methodological foundations. Climatic Change 41, 303-331. 
Pizer, W.A., 1996. Optimal Choice of Instrument and Stringency under Uncertainty: Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Analysis of Climate Change Policy. Resources for the future, Washington, DC.                                       
Price, C., 1995. Emissions, concentrations and disappearing CO2. Resource and Energy Economics 17, 
87-97. 
Rabl, A., 1996. Discounting of long-term costs: What would future generations prefer us to do? 
Ecological Economics 17, 137-145. 
Richels, R., Edmonds, J., 1995. The economics of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Energy 
Policy 23, 373-378. 
Roca, J., Padilla, E, Farré, M., Galletto, V., 2001. Economic growth and atmospheric pollution in 
Spain: discussing the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis. Ecological Economics 39, 85-99. 
Rotmans, J., Dowlatabadi, H., Fialr, J.A., Parson, E.A., 1998. Integrated assessment of climate change: 
evaluation of methods and strategies. In Rayner, E., Malone, E.L., Human Choice and Climate 
Change. Chapter 10. Battelle Press, Columbus. 
  
25
Schelling, T.C., 1992. Some economics of global warming. American Economic Review 82, 1-14. 
Schelling, T.C., 1995. Intergenerational discounting. Energy Policy 23, 395-401. 
Schultz, P.A., Kasting, J.F., 1997. Optimal reductions in CO2 emissions. Energy Policy 25, 491-550. 
Selden, T.M., Song, D., 1994. Environmental quality and development: Is there a Kuznets curve for 
air pollution estimates? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27, 147-162. 
Stern, D.I., Common, M.S., Barbier, E.B., 1996. Economic growth, trade and the environment: 
implications for the environmental Kuznets curve. World Development 24, 1151-1160. 
Weyant, J., Davidson, O., Dowlatabadi, H., Edmonds, J., Grubb, M., Parson, E. A., Richels, R., 
Rotmans, J., Shukla, P. R., Tol, R. S. J., Cline, W., Fankhauser, S., 1995 Integrated assessments of 
climate change: An overview and comparison of approaches and results. In IPCC, Climate Change 
1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 448. 
Wigley, T.M.L., Richels, R., Edmonds, J.A., 1996. Economic and environmental choices in the 
stabilization of atmospheric CO2 emissions. Nature 379, 240-243. 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Yohe, G.H., 1999. The tolerable windows approach: lessons and limitations. Climatic Change 41, 283-
295. 
